

#### E.CA Economics

Gatekeepers, dominance, economic dependency, ex-ante regulation


Online, 23 December 2020

# 117th GCLC Virtual Lunch Talk

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#### Introduction



- Conflicts?
  - 10 years for the Belgian Competition Authority (joint memorandum Benelux)
  - My colleagues work or have worked for or against Facebook, Google, payment platforms, online travel agents, and others
- Burning actuality
  - in the EU: Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act
  - ... and increasingly in the US: actions of the FTC and States against Facebook, and of the DOJ and States against Google
- On the agenda for today: define policy instruments that could be used to address market failures in the online world
- Caveat:
  - I will speak of digital or online markets, while I believe that many of these markets differ in many ways. Social networks, online retailers, OS developers, payment systems, designers of mobile devices each face different sets of constraints.
  - Tendency to focus on success and forget about failure.

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### The questions you want to answer are the same as in the offline world

Identifying the sources of market power:

- Which existing companies exert competitive constraints on the alleged dominant firm?
- What prevents entry?
- Or looked at from the other side: what is a user's **next best option**?
- And, what are the sources of switching costs?
- Is one of the parties locked-in, and why?
- How can market power be **quantified**?



**e.CA** economics

# Economies of scale and economies of scope

- Serious economies of scale usually favour large companies in the digital environment
  - Significant fixed costs: for the development of an OS system, a search engine, or a social network.
  - In many cases, close to zero costs of serving an additional client
- Also notable economies of scope
  - Easier for a dominant firm to enter in an adjacent market (the so-called **envelopment** theory of harm; see for instance Condorelli & Padilla, JCLE, 2020)
  - Access to competent and motivated **staff** (coding, but also marketing, design, and data management)
  - Monetization of insights from the new market by existing business units (eg, online advertising)
  - Additional options of large platforms can generate competitive advantages or additional sources of revenue for their ecosystems

### Direct and indirect network effects

- · Direct network effects reinforce companies with market power
  - Users benefit from the presence of other users: Word, WhatsApp, Facebook
  - Users are unlikely to switch to an alternative provider, if other users do not switch
  - Possibility to target specific group of users?
- Indirect network effects make it even more difficult for entrants
  - Users benefit from the presence of other categories of users: payment cards, game developers, advertisers
  - Users are unlikely to switch to an alternative provider, if the other category of users does not switch
  - So-called single homers are better treated
- Counter-intuitive economic insights?
  - Exclusive agreements may over-compensate single-homers
  - Exact model set-up is sometimes crucial (eg, user externality derives from membership Vs interaction?)

#### Data

- Access to data plays a remarkable role in online markets
  - Ability to target specific customer groups, which is crucial for marketeers
  - Ability to price discriminate
  - Intra-group data sharing is easier than cross-group data-sharing, through tying of privacy policy
- Who generates data?
  - Who generates insights when a producer of sports equipment organizes an online marketing campaign through one or more channels to identify potential clients?
  - Social platforms and online market places are difficult to by-pass to access (existing) customers
- Decreasing or increasing returns to data?
  - Very little is known on returns to data: it is often valuable to connect different aspects of a profile, which suggests that there is virtually no limit to data richness (some information is quickly outdated)
  - Not easy to organize data-sharing to favour entry, in a privacy compliant manner

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# Policy instrument: comparing two main sources of errors

- As has been seen, there are many sources of market power in online markets
  - They reinforce each other
  - Online markets are prone to tipping
- · How should the appropriate policy instrument be selected?
  - For each candidate policy instrument, try and minimize the expected cost of error
  - Besides minimizing error cost, enforcement must be predictable and timely
  - Instruments are **not** necessarily **mutually exclusive**; if well-designed they complement each other
- Overenforcement (type I error)
  - Enforcement, when non-enforcement would have been preferable
  - Cost of error: reduced user benefit? reduced innovation? reduced incentives to invest?
- Underenforcement (type II error)
  - Non-enforcement, when enforcement would have been preferable
  - Cost of error: effect on competitors? on entry? on innovation?

# Regulation

#### Platform-to-business (P2B) regulation

- Entry into force in July 2019
- Objective: create a fairer, more transparent and predictable business environment for smaller businesses and traders on online platforms
- Digital Services Act
  - Revision and extension of the 2000 e-Commerce Directive that harmonized the cross-border provision of online services in the EU
  - Increased obligations on transparency, user empowerment, risk management and industry cooperation
  - Enforcement by a Digital Services Coordinator with significant investigation powers, including ability to carry out on-site inspections, interview staff members and require the production of documents and information

#### Digital Markets Act

- Introduces rules for platforms that act as gatekeepers in the digital sector
- Gatekeeper: "core platform service" in at least three EEA Member States, €6.5 Bn turnover in the EEA, and other criteria on market capitalization (€65 Bn), and number of users (45m active users)
- Obligations such as: inter-operability with third parties, interdiction to use business data to compete against them, access to data generated by activities on the platform

#### Regulation, antitrust, economic dependence and merger control

# **Competition tools**

#### Abuse of dominance

- Many cases in the EU, in Member States, and also, more recently, in the US
- Difficult to summarise all theories of harm
- Abuse of economic dependence
  - New law on economic dependence in Belgium, which joins a long list of countries with similar provisions
  - French and German NCAs have made clear that there should be a role for such provisions in online markets
  - Lower intervention thresholds?
    - · Raises a number of questions, especially in two-sided markets, where singlehomers often benefit from exclusivity
    - Entry often requires targeting specific groups (divide and conquer strategy)
    - German online travel agents case: does multihoming mean that access to all platforms is necessary?
- Merger control
  - Killer acquisition (or reverse killer acquisition), acquisition of nascent competitors and envelopment theory of harm
  - Merger control requires to be able to predict market evolution, which is especially difficult in disrupting markets such as online markets
  - Would there be a way to hold the acquired firm separate, or at least to ensure that it could be divested, after a review?